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This paper relates the political decision-process which allowed Germany to transform
its planned economic system into a Social Market Economy after the Second World
War. The central problem of the paper is to understand how the Social Market
Economy emerged in Germany. Was it primarily an imported model of organization
of the society and of the economy, or did it evolve mainly from the political and
economical history of Germany? The argument of the paper is that the choice for a
liberal market economy did not come naturally to Germany: the industrialization of
Germany and the economical and political constraints that Germany faced after the
war shaped a critical juncture which allowed a “liberal revolution”.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Papier wird der politische Entscheidungsprozeß dargestellt, als dessen Folge
Deutschland von einer Zwangswirtschaft in eine Soziale Marktwirtschaft transformiert
wurde. Zentrales Problem ist es zu verstehen, wie, d.h. nach welcher Logik, sich die
Soziale Marktwirtschaft in  Deutschland herausgebildet hat. War es ein im
wesentlichen importiertes Modell zur Organisation einer Gesellschaft und einer
Volkswirtschaft oder hat sie sich als eine erwartbare Folge der geschichtlichen
Entwicklung von Politik und Wirtschaft in Deutschland herausgebildet ? In dem
Papier wird die Meinung vertreten, daß die Wahl für eine liberale Marktwirtschaft
nicht gleichsam „naturwüchsig“ zustande gekommen ist: Die Industrialisierung
Deutschlands und die ökonomischen und politischen Einschränkungen, denen
Deutschland nach dem Krieg unterlag, haben sich zu einer Konstellation („critical
juncture“) verdichtet, in der eine „liberale Revolution“ möglich werden konnte.
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The second world war was a conflict of ideologies. The victory of some and the
defeat of others reshuffled the political game between the belligerent countries.
The winners try to impose their conceptions in order both to establish their new
powers and to ensure a stable political situation in Europe. The defeated
parties, particularly Germany, tried to restore a relative national autonomy, that
was challenged by the material consequences and the international treaties on
the conflict resolution. So, more than a simple economic reconstruction, the
defeated countries have to face a real transformation of national policy.
The question of their political and economical organization then resolves
around power relations between the western Allied nations, the communist bloc
and the different lobbies remaining in those countries. But ideologically
wounded by the conflict, the losers have a very limited range of choices
regarding the political direction they can take.
On its western side, which is influenced by the Anglo-Saxon countries,
Germany exhibits an interesting arbitration model which lays the foundations of
the Social Market Economy. The emergence of such a model based on a
market economy could be considered as a liberal revolution for Germany,
breaking with a tradition of socialism and collectivism. Thus, regarding the
limited political autonomy of Germany at this time and the revendication of the
allied nations, the question of the political origin of this rupture should be asked.
This paper assembles some of the elements of this model of political and
economical organization, now known as the "German Model" or “capitalisme
rhénan” as Michel Albert described it (Albert [1991]), and asks if it can be traced
to this Anglo-Saxon influence, or if it presents (and to what extent)
characteristics mainly derived from the political and economical history of
Germany.
Fisrtly the constraints that West Germany had to face for its reconstruction
after the war would be examined. My point is to demonstrate that in spite of
good global statistical indicators, the economic system reached a primitive
level, which with the march into liberalism wanted by allied authorities
demanded economic reforms (2.). It will be then shown how the Social Market
Economy succeeded in emerging through economic legal transformation
supported by Ludwig Ehrard (3.). The foundations of this model will then be2
mentioned, exploring the theoretical discourse of Ordoliberalism (4.), in order to
identify what elements are plainly peculiar to it (5.).
2. The Economical and Political Constraints for the Reconstruc-
tion of West Germany : Between International Assistance
and Allied Occupation
The first constraints are obviously material ones. The needs are huge for
repairing the infrastructure and providing for the population's subsistence.
However it must be noted that if the national economy could not fulfill the needs
of the population
1, it was not destroyed but only paralyzed because of the
destroyed transport infrastructure. The productive potential at the end of the
war is still 11% higher than its level of 1936 (Grosser [1988b]) in spite of the
dismantling politics, thanks to the high rate of investment imposed by a war
economy. Particularly, the steel potential is assessed at 90% of what it was
before the beginning of the war, and to between 80 and 85% for the chemical
and mechanical industries (Wahl [1991]). Then the main problem of the
German economy after the war is not to reconstruct the means of production,
but to convert its industry to fit the needs of the population and to transform a
war-economy into a peace-economy. The quickness with which Germany
restore its capacities can be explained in part by the fact that the financial and
time investment of a reconversion is less than reconstruction. Nevertheless, two
others factors are relevant for the postwar German economic structure.
First, the continuous flow of refugees from the East, which was not halted
until the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961. By April 1950 West Germany
had already 9 million refugees, an increase of 21,6% over the 1939 population
2
bringing almost immediately larger labor force.
Secondly, the programs of international aid have a major importance in the
material reconstruction of German society and economy, insofar as they allow
some substantial savings. The contribution of the Marshall Plan to Germany
between 1948 and 1952 alone amounts to $ 1.4 billions. This assistance will
play a double role by permitting import of necessary missing raw materials to
reduce scarcity and by releasing means of production from this task for the
capital goods and construction industries. Thus, the contribution of the mining
industry to net industrial production sinks from 42% in 1950 to 36% in 1954,
whereas this fraction rises respectively from 19% to near 21,2% for the
                                                          
1 Agriculture covers only 35% of the food needs in 1945.
2 My calculation based on figures in Röpke [1950].3
processing industry and from 18% to 21,14% for the construction industry in the
same time period
3.
Yet post-war west Germany’s economic situation is the subject of a heated
scholarly debate. The idea of a paralyzed but non-destroyed economy, which
could easily restart, is held above all by historians like Abelshauser, Petzina or
Hardach (Abelshauser & Petzina [1981], Hardach [1980]). German liberal
economists like Willgerodt or Lenel, however, challenge such general statistics,
because according to them they do not reflect the reality of the economic
system. "Die Kapitalausstattung Westdeutschlands im Jahre 1948 wird vielfach
als besonders günstig eingeschätzt, weil das industrielle Anlagevermögen rein
technisch die Kriegszerstörungen und Demontagen ziemlich gut überstand.
Aber es kommt für eine funktionsfähige Wirtschaft nicht nur auf das industrielle
Anlagevermögen an" (Willgerodt [1994:65]).
From their calculations it appears that the capital which could be used for a
peace-time economy in 1949 represented less than 35,7% of the capital stock
of 1939 (Hoffmann [1965:253]). In housing, 20% was destroyed, 20 %
damaged, and more importantly, outside the rural areas, inhabitable housing
was just a little more than 50% (Willgerodt [1994]). Finally, food intake was
reduced from 2200 calories per person per day in 1944 to 1000 and less in
1947.
These statistics reflect the chaos of post-war Germany’s economy. In
Gutmann et al.’s words: "Die deutsche Bevölkerung verlor schnell das
Vertrauen in die arbeitsteiligte Wirtschaftsweise. Sie hatte meist Geld, aber das
Geld hatte kaum Wert. Auf dem Papier waren viel noch durchaus vermögend,
aber niemand wußte, welchem Wert ihre Anlagen hatten, oder ob sie ihnen
bleiben würden. Die Preise waren nach wie vor gestoppt. Praktische Bedeutung
hatten die Stoppreise jedoch nur für Lieferung an die Besatzungsmächte und
für rationierte Güter. Das Geld hörte auf, allegemeines Tauschmittel zu sein; es
wurde durch den Naturalaustausch mehr und mehr verdrängt. Allenfalls wurde
es zu horrenden Schwarzmarktpreisen für Sachgüter in Tausch genommen"
(Gutmann, Hochstrate, Schlüter [1964:2]).
The situation was difficult for firms as well. If they could produce
something, they had to deliver it with priority to occupation authorities or leave it
to supply instructions. Firms were not in control of their products, and had
inventory problems, because of the stalled imports and the forced increased
exports as a result of the dismantling of the industrial apparatus and forced
deliveries to allied authorities. Firms were therefore obliged to participate in
Kompensations-geschäft, i.e. swapping.
                                                          
3 My calculation based on figures in Statistisches Bundesamt [1972].4
To allow their firms to survive, German businessmen tried to escape from
the Allied orders by producing “free” articles, which were not requisitioned or
whose prices were not fixed. Thus, instead of producing goods that were
needed and demanded, they produced articles like ashtrays, lamps, tiles, etc. in
great quantity. They also participated in illegal activities on the black market.
Finally, even if the production capacities of Germany were not completely
destroyed, more important still is the fact that the economic system was simply
unable to operate at all. The coordination of the agents could neither be
ensured by the market system, because money had lost its exchange standard
value, nor by a central plan insofar as the exchanges were no more in control of
the legal authorities because of the swapping and the black market. For Walter
Eucken, the German economic system had degraded to a very primitive
economic system. (Eucken [1952]).
The international assistance has some attached strings with repercussions
on German economic organization. In exchange for a financial aid, which is
attributed 85% in budgetary form, the Marshall plan, by means of the O.E.C.E.,
binds the European aided countries to economic cooperation and to an opening
of their markets. An objective of this program is to integrate the European
economies into the world markets and stabilize their political situation. But the
constraints are not only institutional ones, they are mostly due to the structure
of the German economy. The confinement of the Soviet zone deprived the FRG
of a part of its agricultural capacities and modified the sectoral distribution of
industry between primary and secondary, which had been carried out in the old
Reich territory according to an East-West logic. So agriculture, which reached
20,5% of NDP for the period 1930-1934, represents only 10,6% for the western
zone
4. Domestic supply was then insufficient and subjects the German markets
to international market pressures requiring a surplus in other sectors. Germany
had no longer an self-sufficiency in organization, which accounted for the
strength of its development during the first half of the twentieth century (Bilger
[1960]). The situation forces it to open its markets and subscribe in a certain
way to the principles of economic liberalism.
From a political point of view, the trusteeship exercised by the occupying
forces is a determining factor. The Potsdam conference, that sets the principles
for the political action in the different zones, displays the objectives of
demilitarization, denazification, decartellization and democratization. But
beyond these common general principles, the Allied powers will apply in their
own zone original and specific administrative principles, because (among
others reasons) of the absence of a strong central administration
5. These
                                                          
4 Hardach [1980:223].
5 France was fiercely opposed to the creation of a central governmental administration. The only
created entity was a council of control, which gathered the military administrators of the5
agreements mark the end of German sovereignty. According to Alfred Grosser,
Germany became an "object". By reason of the principle of democratization, a
relative autonomy persists only in the administration of the "Länder" through of
their president-ministers. A political debate will be as well instituted when the
Allies decide to erect common ramparts to communism with a unified zone,
which was first economic and later political. It is on these levels that some
German personalities could infuse some new ideas in the political and
economical reconstruction of their country.
3. Emergence of the Social Market Economy
The American and English policies are economically very active. In spite of
difficulties, the two countries retained from the Potsdam conference the idea to
make of Germany a single economic entity and set down objectives for the
German economy in this manner. The conceptions on the nature of the
objectives nevertheless diverge. The British zone, which was at this time
dominated by Labor influence, turns into a high centralized administration
without repulsion for planning and nationalization. The authority of Kurt
Schumacher, the SPD's main leader, contributed in this zone towards
developing the idea of a German socialist democracy. With agreement of the
Deutsches Gewerschaft Bund, he directed the later debates on the extent of
the co-determination law for an economic democracy. On contrast the
Americans have a more liberal view and aim their policy toward the return to
greater economic equilibrium and the forced decartellization of the German
economy
6. Their mistrust towards big German firms and especially the cartels is
explained by the close relations they had with the Nazi State. The American
authorities would replace the "Organized Capitalism" of the 20's (Feldman
[1981], K. Hardach [1980]) with a capitalism free from all influences of the State
and the different lobbies, bounding the economic power in order to limit the
political power of Germany.
The question of the choice of the economic system became great
importance during the debates on the creation of the "Bizone"
7. It is within the
Council, the legislative instrument of Bizone's administration, that the economic
orientation of the future FRG will emerge. The Americans outwards succeed in
putting through their point of view, but this time with the support of the German
                                                                                                                                                                         
occupying zones. The application of the council’s decision remained in the hands of the
commanding officers of each zone.
6 During the 1930´s, Germany had approximately 3000 cartels (Grosser [1988a]).
7 The Bizone was an American and English common administrative zone with regard to the
economy, supplying, post, finances and transports. It was placed under the strict authority of the
occupying forces and didn't possess political power.6
politicians. The election of this Council, made up of 52 members elected by the
Landtage, establishes the CDU-CSU and DP liberal alliance, which decides in
favor of the market economy and blocks the SPD in its centralization program.
By 1948 the choice is taken in favor of the system of the market economy by
means of two laws. Beyond the material constraints, these laws inscribe West
Germany in a system which is not historically familiar to Germans.
The first of these laws concerns the monetary reform instituting the
Deutsche Mark on 20 June 1948. It aims at the re-establishment of healthy
economic bases, which means the reduction of inflation
8 and the resolution of
the Nazi state's debts. This law was prepared long in advanced by the
American authorities in collaboration with the Bizone's economic council. The
second law, without which this embedding in the system of the market economy
would be incomplete and even unsuccessful (Ehrard [1948a]), concerns the
liberalization of prices and means of production. This law of 24 June 1948
9 do
not abolish immediately the command economy (Zwangswirtschaft) of the
military Allied authorities, but means an irreversible turn toward the liberalization
of the German markets (Art 2 §1 of the annex of this law
10) in the explicit aim to
inject some dynamism in the production and to help fulfill the monetary reform
(Preamble of the law, Ibid.). It decrees the liberalization of prices except on
products which do not directly threaten the supplying of the economy, threaten
the realization of certain centralized economic programs, or whose scarcity
could lead to monopoly behavior
11. In all, more than four hundred products will
be released from more than 10 years of complete economic planning. The
fundamental interest of this second law for my subject is that it was passed
without the concertation of the Allied authorities with the sole responsibility of
Ludwig Erhard, director of the economic council since the spring of 1948.
His action was decisive for the construction of the FRG's economic system.
First Bavaria's finance minister in 1945, then director of the economy of the
occupied zones and member of the London conference about the preparation
of an independent German democratic state, he had been always trusted by
the American authorities. He was supported too by the Christian Democrat
Party, which allowed him to obtain the economic post in the Adenauer's cabinet
                                                          
8 The CPI increased continuously from the end of the war and by the time of the monetary
reform It was a 30,34% higher level than in1938 (My calculation based on figures in Statistisches
Bundesamt [1972]).
9 “Gesetz über Leitsätze für Bewirtschaftung und Preispolitik nach der Geldreform”, in Gesetz-
und Verordnungsblatt des Wirtschaftsrates des vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes [1948].
10 “Anlage zum Gesetz über Leitsätze für Bewirtschaftung und Preispolitik nach der Geldreform”,
Ibid.
11 That means that were remained contingencies on consumption and production on the
following products : necessary raw materials for industry and agricultural exploitation, first
necessity products and Energy.7
and the title of vice-chancellor in 1957. He was also Chancellor between 1963
and 1966. If he remains famous for being the "father" of the "German economic
miracle" and the founder of the postwar monetary order, he derives the
principles of his political action from an Ordoliberal doctrine and a particular
conception of the Social Market Economy. The ideas and concepts developed
or defended in this school of thought are easily recognizable in his political
trajectory, as for instance the social direction given to the Market Economy
(Erhard [1948a]) or the terse terms he uses to condemn the ultra-liberal laissez-
faire credo (Erhard [1948b])
12. This course will be helped by the active
participation of some of the main founders of this doctrine in the pre-FRG
economic administration
13 and later in Konrad Adenauer's and Ludwig Erhard's
CDU's governments, either at the Economic Ministry or at the council of
Advisors (Sachverständigenrat)
14. Their policy will allow Germany to overcome
the consequences of the war economy and to go progressively from the
Zwangswirtschaft to a market economy, including the realization of the Social
Market Economy.
4. The Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social Market Economy
The concept of the Social Market Economy would be developed by Alfred
Müller-Armack in 1947. This "economic style" (Wirtschaftsstyl, Schefold
[1995a]) refers to an economic and political order, which is designed on the
basis of the rules of a market economy, that is however enriched with
institutionalized assured social complements limiting the negative
consequences of a free market economy and with legislative instruments
aiming to fight economic concentration and misuses of powers
15. It is
                                                          
12 In a speech from 1948 following the laws of the 18th, 20th and 24th June, L.Erhard asserts :
“[...] sie [the planned Economy] mußte abgelöst werden durch eine Marktwirtschaft, die nichts zu
tun hat mit dem Schlagworten, die ihr angeheftet werden und die aus der Rumpelkammer des
Liberalismus stammen. Nicht die freie Marktwitschaft des liberalistischen Freibeutertums einer
vergangener Area, auch nicht das «freie Spiel der Kräfte» und dergleichen Phrasen, mit denen
man hausieren geht, sondern die sozial verpflichtete Marktwirtschaft, die das einzelne
Individuum wieder zur Geltung kommen läßt, die den Wert der Persönlichkeit oben an stellt und
der Leistung dann aber auch den verdienten Ertrag zugute kommen läßt, das ist die
Marktwirtschft moderner Prägung” (Erhard [1948b:48]).
13 For instance 6 main members of this school of thought were members of the economic
council and thus responsible for preparing the moentary reform.
14 It is relevant to notice the participation of Alfred Müller-Armack (Erhard's adviser and "junior
minister" for Economy), Walter Eucken (member of the Bizone's scientific council and later of
the Ministry for Economy) and Wilhelm Röpke (Erhard's and Adenauer's adviser).
15 "Soziale Marktwirtschaft, d.h. eine nach der Regeln der Marktwirtschaft ablaufende, aber mit
sozialen Ergänzungen und Sicherungen versehene Wirtschaft [...]. Sie allein bietet auch in ihrer
soziologischen Schichtung zwar keine ideale Hierarchie, jedoch eine Ordnung, in der durch8
considerably based on works and reflections conducted at the Freiburg School.
This school was partly managed by Walter Eucken since 1933, and is founded
in the economic literature with the terms of Ordoliberalism or Ordnungstheorie.
This system of thinking offers a reflection from the experience of the economic
policies particularly observed in Germany during the industrialization process.
The declared aim consists in taking advantage of the efficiency of the market
system and fitting it out for serving the freedom of the Individual. In this way
Walter Eucken defines the "principles of economic policy" in order to find an
"efficient and man’s dignified order" of economy and society (leistungsfähige
und menschenwürdige Ordnung, Eucken [1940], [1952]).
The analysis developed by the Ordoliberal movement directs its critiques of
the consequences of a totally free market system at the freedom of individuals.
A market system works by means of self-determination and self-control of
agents' decisions taken in accordance with the information that markets convey
(Hayek [1937]). It can follow asymmetrical positions of the agents according to
the power they have on producing and obtaining information. This is the case of
monopolies like the state or cartels, the position of which allows them to bypass
markets constraints and impose rules on the markets that are favorable to them
(for instance market-dominating strategies, powers on contracting, concealment
of information, etc.). Eucken saw in the precarious social situation at the
beginning of the twentieth century an expression of the misuse of these
powers, reflected in the extremely low wages rates, the precarity of the working
conditions, and so on (Eucken, [1952]). A main idea of this form of German
Neoliberalism consists in showing that the socially baneful consequences of the
market are neither due to the market process nor to the nature of Capitalism,
but to particular forms of markets and to the behavior adopted by economic
agents according to these forms. The misuse of power in the economic sphere
leads not only to inefficiency in the allocative process because of monopoly
behavior but also to a loss of freedom of other agents that can undermine their
basic rights. An example of that conception could be the anticompeting
practices of technical or tariff barriers at the entrance of a market, which can
distort the right of free business and the right of free contracting.
Concerns about individual freedom and the respect of his fundamental
rights by and in the economic sphere make laissez-faire policies incompatible
with the defense of a state based on the rule of law or Rechtsstaat (Röpke
[1950]). Ordoliberalism derives political consequences from economic theories
developed in the first period of industrialization, particularly Adam Smith's
theory, and shows in particular that liberalism, as understood in these
economic theories, is an incomplete translation of the concept of political
liberalism which arose in eighteenth-century England. The freedom of the
                                                                                                                                                                         
weitgehende Neutralisierung der Machtpositionen und eine Aufteilung der Macht ein erträgliches
Minimum gesellschaftlichen Zwanges der Entfaltung persönlicher Freiheit nicht in Wege steht"
(Müller-Armack, [1948:148]).9
individual in the economic sphere does not have to be understood as the right
of free exercising an economic activity without legislative rules. Economic
activity is an integrated part of the citizenship and so entails rights and duties.
The solution, which is then chosen by the Ordoliberals, consists in writing
an economic constitution which completes the political constitution. It lays the
principles for the efficient functioning of markets according to the values
protected by society, by means of common determination and control. This
economic constitution must realize a "competition order" that conforms to the
Rechtstaat, and emphasizes in this way the regulation of private and public
economic powers. For the private sector, a cartel office will be in charge of
dismantling existing monopolies or cartels, of the preventing new concentration
processes, and of imposing competition emulating behavior on cartels or
monopolies that cannot be dismantled. For the public sector, the Ordoliberals
adopt the Christian principle of the subsidiarity of the state
16, in order to give it a
relative neutrality, which allows it a behavior in conformity with market
principles. Its economic action is the subject of a precise definition, according to
which its role is to ensure the application and respect of the principles set by
the constitution, to act on the framework but not on the process of the
economy.
Ordnungspolitik and Prozeßpolitik are legacies of this logic. In its theoretical
understanding, the first concept calls for norm definitions which express the
principles of the competition order (for instance the system of the property
rights), the second features measures which bring the existing economic and
social order into conformity with the designed competition order (for instance
social policy or competition policy). Thus, unlike "laissez-faire" policies where
the threat to individual freedom lies in the public sector, Ordoliberalism stresses
the role of private economic powers in threatening this freedom. The basic idea
of specifying behavioral norms consists in the legal creation of a competition
order, which is designed to retain only the benefits of market competition.
Eucken calls this order Leistungswettbewerb (Eucken [1952]), the efficiency of
which, in terms of market allocation and social justice, is inversely proportional
to the concentration of markets or to economic power. The conception of
Leistungswettbewerb translates a believe in the general equilibrium that can
only be reached within a legal framework
17.
                                                          
16 See the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum.
17 The emphasis of the role of the legal framework on the economic efficiency is a very topical
subject for the modern economic science. In this way many economists tried to establish a
parallel between the Ordnungstheorie and the constitutional Economic (THutchinson [1981],
Vanberg [1988]). They follow the more general idea of the efficiency of behavioral norms, which
is the heart of the paradigm of the New Institutional Economic. A lot of work can likewise be
found on the comparison of the German and American schools (Hutchinson [1984],
Schimdtchen [1994], Tietzel [1991] and Streit [1992]). It should be added, however, that if the10
To reinforce this framework, it was decided to entrust the monetary policy
to an independent organism, whose goal is the guarantee of monetary stability.
This system must prevent the money supply from coming a political instrument
of the state and provides economic agents a greater transparency of markets.
This solution is adopted because of the impossibility of a return to the gold-
exchange standard in the world economy (Eucken [1952]). "The Ordoliberal
justification of the independence of the central bank" (Dehay [1995]) has to be
understood as a second-best solution to ensure the goals of price and
monetary stability.
Since market competition ultimately remains a hard social process, it is
advisable to help people who cannot integrate themselves in such a society,
who are excluded or disadvantaged. A social policy is thus justified but will be a
element of dissension and of divergence among different theorists of the
Freiburg School. Three theses on the nature of social policy can be identified
within the movement. The first, which is a radical one, is defended by Hayek
and supposes the incompatibility of every social measure with a market system
(Hayek [1957]). The second thesis, the basis of which is developed by Alfred
Müller-Armack and in a relative sense by Wihlelm Röpke, considers the
sociological measures of town and country planning, subsidies to the emergent
industries and to innovation, the defense of the Mittelstand, the co-action
between the salaried staff and the employers, and so on, are the responsibility
of the state. The social state here has the aim to ensure the stable growth of
society without destroying its features and to reduce differences between the
social classes (Müller-Armack [1948], Röpke [1950]). This view will be close to
the second step policy of the Social Market Economy in the late 60’s. A third
conception of Ordoliberal social policy, that can be described as a middle
around, is expressed by Eucken. He recognizes the social reasons for such a
policy, but he does not want to strike a blow to the market mechanism. The
social policy resulting from such concerns takes an exclusively subsidiary
character and tends to disappear when all people are integrated in the market
society. The market is implied to be the best social policy (marktwirtschaftliche
Sozialpolitik, Lenel [1971]). These diverging points of view explain the fact that
the Social Market Economy does not contain a commonly accepted measure of
social justice. The only consensus that can be seen in the non-radical theses is
that of a subsidiary redistribution of income and of the widening of capital
ownership (Lange [1988]), in order to aim at a working-class capitalism or a
society without classes.
The Ordoliberal movement was of course not alone in defining the Social
Market Economy as it was politically implemented. In spite of the presence of
members of this school in the highest places of society, democratic interaction
allowed only a partial adoption of their principles. The competition laws in 1957
                                                                                                                                                                         
theoretical basis are comparable, the aims of these two theories are different and make the
German school closer to the old institutional tradition of J.R.Commons' reasonnable capitalism
(Broyer & Dutraive [1995]).11
are an example of that (Blum [1980], Lenel [1989], Thieme [1991]). However,
Ordoliberalism sheds light on a great part of the ideas which define the policy
model of the Social Market Economy. It offers an analysis of economic systems
(Schefold [1995a]) that is subdivided into two steps. The fist step consists in
identifying categories (market forms, monetary forms, property rights system,
etc.), the set of which defines two ideal types : the pure market economy and
the pure centralized planned economy. The second step is to compare these
ideal types to real types, i.e. concrete economic systems existing in time and
space, in order to identify the parts of the real type which prevent the efficient
functioning of the ideal type in society. So, the Eucken's competition order
offers a pragmatic answer for the problems Germany faces with its
reconstruction, drawing inference from the political and economical experiments
that Germany had been undergoing. The real type is placed above the ideal
type, allowing political economy to go from pure theory to something a
pragmatic, if not a doctrine. In this method, which is called "morphological
analysis", Eucken realizes a synthesis between historicism and theory which
use the latter to fulfill the requirements of the first. The systematic development
of this thought can thus be used as a heuristic for a political idea. Social Market
Economy uses the theoretical developments of the Freiburg school to apply its
values system. Style and system complement one another (Schefold [1995a],
[1995b]), giving to the first the theoretical background it needs for defining its
action and giving to the second a political aim to reach.
5. An Economic Style Inherited from the Industrialization Period
of Germany
Ordoliberalism and Social Market Economy intersect around a common plan,
the origin of which lies within the Freiburg School. This movement is set up
from 1938 as a reaction against the "Crystal night" and gathers academics and
ecclesiastics, scientifically and ideologically opposed to the Nazi regime
18. The
works, that are managed there by economists and jurists, define the economic
principle of Ordoliberalism. But one cannot neglect the fact that the Freiburg
School was first a place for defending the liberal ideas in German society and
that it goes beyond just the issues of Ordoliberal economic policy. It is only in
this consciousness that the economic policy they defined, and particularly the
place of the Christian doctrine, can be understood
19. These liberal values
                                                          
18 See Rübsam & Schadek [1990] and Rieter & Schmolz [1993] for a detailed history of the
Freiburg school.
19 It is most probably by reason of a strict Anglo-Saxon reading, that the severe wellcome the
economists gave to the political recipes of the young FRG in spite of its success and the12
address not only the Nazi regime, but exhibit moral commitment against all
collectivist tendencies familiar to German history.
Germany's period of Industrialization was indeed characterized by heavy
economical and political collectivization. Unlike what happened in Great Britain,
this period of social transformation was not really accompanied by a
liberalization process. Politically the constitution of 1871 meant a backward step
of the liberalism espoused by the Frankfurt Paulskirche constitution of 1849.
Later the Weimar constitution could not ensure democracy. This bears witness
to a "German backwardness" for choosing the liberal way (Hardach [1971]).
From an economic point of view, this period is characterized by a high
institutionalization process for facing the technically necessary transformations
(cartellization) and defending the interests hurt by this transformation (unions
and guilds), and by always increasing state interventions in order to reduce the
instability due to the economic climate and to arbitrate interference due to the
actions of these lobbies. Thus, instead of liberalizing the economy,
industrialization gives rise in Germany to a highly organized economic society
based on the play of public and private powers and “counterpowers”. This
reality is translated in the concept of "organized capitalism" (organisierter
Kapitalismus) which reaches its paroxysm between the two world wars
(Feldman [1981]). This organization was strengthened by ideas current at that
time in Germany. It expressed the conceptions of Gustav Schmoller (1838-
1917), taking up the thesis of Adam Müller (1779-1829) and Friedrich List
(1789-1846) favorable to self-sufficient and concentrated capitalism, justified by
the sense of identity of societies and nations and therefore opposed to the
universalism of the English liberal philosophy (Gonnard [1930]).
However the Weimar constitution started a liberalization process of
economic life. Article 151 assessed that “Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens
muß den Grundsätzen der Gerechtigkeit mit dem Ziel eines menschenwürdigen
Daseins für alle entsprechen”. It reveals another debate, about "economic
democracy", that can itself be understood as a consequence of organized
capitalism and its misuses of economic power. This other concept was widely
developed by the ADGB
20 during union meetings in Breslau in 1925 and
Hamburg in 1928 under the direction of Fritz Naphtali. It proposes a
democratization of the economy in order to pull the worker from the statute of
an object to an economic subject, by means of paritary representation between
salaried staff and employers in factories and firms. This concept lays the basis
for paritary Mitbestimmung rights (Hamm [1980]). However this democratization
doe not go together with economic liberalism. Democratization requires
collectivization of the economy which is considered as the only way of ensuring
freedom for the individual (Naphtali [1928]). This debate will have a strong
influence on economic analysis in Germany, showing the insufficiency of
                                                                                                                                                                         
difficulties of the Ordoliberal theorists to explain their theories can be explained (Hutchison
[1981:§5]).
20 Allgemeiner Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund.13
political democracy and the necessity to complement it with economic rules of
law.
It is within this scope, on the question of the economic powers, of ensuring
the freedom of the individual in economic sphere and democratization of the
economy, as well as the rejection of the Nazi ideology, that the developments of
Ordoliberalism and the Social Market Economy come. They search for an
answer to the problems posed by the industrialization and the division of labor
in Germany and break with the tendencies of a sozialistischer Zeitgeist (Blum
[1980]).
Nevertheless this liberal revolution does not mean a boundless support for
all to the classic liberalism. On the contrary, German neoliberalism is based on
Kant's liberal philosophy, which differs from the English one (Bréhier [1961]).
This philosophical basis frees their liberal conception from a particular value
system and allow their view to be based on reason alone. The aim is to define a
rational economic policy free of any political ideology, that has handicapped
Germany for a long time (Eucken [1952]). Moreover this philosophy gets away
from the English one according to the definition of the freedom itself. On the
contrary to the classical liberalism, Ordoliberalism does not understand the
essence of liberty as a free exchange process between agents (Peacock &
Willgerodt [1989]), but considers it as the free action of the individual within a
given framework, respecting a certain form of ethics or a set of rules. The
individual is free in the sense that the rules protect him from others, ensure his
sphere of freedom and increases his possibilities for action. The rules,
understood as laws, so describe a superior form of rationality, expressing a
common rationality
21. The economic constitution realizes this ethics and
ensures the freedom of agents in the economic sphere by means of control on
their behaviors. In this way it would be incomplete to judge the efficiency of
German competition laws only on its carteldismantling capacities. These laws
have to be considered too as behavioral constraints on economic activities of
the firms.
Two other characteristics make German postwar liberalism different. The
state still conserves the strong social tradition started from the end of the
nineteenth century (Kott [1995]), which is imposed on it by the basic law (Article
20 §1). This characteristic remains strongly inherited from the later debate of
economic democracy on the principles of parity representation between capital
and labor (Mitbestimmung). However, parity principle of these relations does
not express the ideal of the Social Market Economy and only expresses the
ideal of Wirtschaftsdemokratie (Grosser [1988a]). In Müller-Armack's work,
Social Market Economy only refers to a Mitsprache in den sozialen Fragen
without parity representation (Müller-Armack [1960]). The latter is considered
                                                          
21 See Rawls [1993] for the development of this theme.14
from a liberal point of view as a danger for the respect of property rights
(Hensel [1967]). Nevertheless, it conforms to another characteristic of German
liberalism, one of control on the behavior of agents in the economic sphere, by
means of a right of access to decisions affecting the concerned parties. This
character is validated by the constitution in the obligation to use his property
"for the good of the community" (Article 14 §2). This principle is directly
translated from the Christian doctrine (Gonnard [1930]).
6. Conclusion
Social Market Economy based on the theoretical ideas of Ordoliberalism
defines a specific model of political and economical organization, which go
beyond the strict opposition between classical liberalism and socialism based
on the conception of property rights. It asserts itself as a truly "third way" (dritter
Weg Röpke), which seeks in its own liberal philosophy a solution to the
structural problems, that Germany faced since its industrialization. It tends to
define an economic democracy which can resolve the conflict between political
liberalism and market principles, focusing on the question of equality of
economic powers and the institutional coordination of agents. It is certainly in its
liberal objective that Social Market Economy presents its greater originality
according to the political and economical history of Germany. If the question of
economic democracy have been long debated in Germany, it is only with the
works of the Freiburg school that a solution in terms of liberal market economy
is proposed. The American influence was perhaps determining for the choice of
this system, but German postwar Capitalism is not based on an imported model
and establishes, beyond the material and political constraints Germany had to
face in the wake of the war, an alternative economic style.
Contrary to appearances, this question of the specificity of Germany's
political model remains of continuing relevance. The construction of the
European Union and even the economic reforms in France, like the monetary
reform with the independence of the central bank, and the coming social and
fiscal reforms, seem largely inspired by this model. Tracing the old German
tradition on which the style of the Social Market Economy is based allows one
to question the nature of the efficiency of this model. Does it come from the
highly institutionalized, solidarity-favoring structure of German Society, from the
basic definition of economic policy referring to this model, or to the articulation
of the two, i.e. the adaptation of this model to German society ? And to say that
the Social Market Economy takes advantage of the specificities of the German
society signifies questioning its possible applicability to other economic
systems, at least with the same success or the same acceptance of other
peoples.15
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